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In the past few years, both academics and practitioners have devoted increased attention to understanding the dynamics of
business angel (BA) investments. Market data for both the US and Europe show that business angels1 have become a major seg-
ment of the capital market industry, comparable to professional venture capitalists (US ACA, 2015; EVCA, 2014; EBAN, 2015;
Kraemer-Eis et al., 2015; OECD, 2016). As such, BAs have become crucial enablers of the development of new firms and a driving
force of growth (Lahti and Keinonen, 2016; OECD, 2016, Mason, 2009). Despite this recent attention, our understanding of the BA
investment is still limited. In particular, little is known about the investment practices of BAs once they join semi-formal organi-
zations such as BA networks (BAN) and angel groups (AG). This study aims to fill this gap.
BAs are: “high net worth individuals who invest their own money in small unlisted companies, with no family connections, typically
assuming a minority equity stake as well as active involvement in portfolio companies” (Mason, 2008). BAs are among the most ap-
pealing actors in the ecosystem for entrepreneurial businesses, considering their capability to fill the so-called “funding gap” be-
tween the demand and supply for early-stage equity capital (Mason and Harrison, 2000; Johnson and Sohl, 2012; Capizzi, 2015).
First, BAs satisfy a certain size investment need (usually in the range of 100 k–300 k euros) that is not typically considered inter-
esting or profitable for venture capitalists because of the relatively high costs of due diligence, contracting, and monitoringand Business Studies, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Via E. Perrone, 18, 28100 Novara, Italy.
zzi).
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2 S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxassociated with very early-stage businesses (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Carpenter and Peterson, 2002; Mason, 2009). Second, along-
side capital injection, BAs provide valuable non-monetary resources such as industrial knowledge, management experience,
mentoring, and personal networks (Harrison and Mason, 1992; Landstrom, 1993, Politis, 2008).
Over time, angel investors have increasingly organized into associations—also referred to as groups, networks, or clubs, de-
pending on the level of their internal structure (Mason, Botelho and Harrison, 2013)—usually on a geographic or industrial
basis. The objectives of such organizations range from increasing the deal flow by sharing presentation pitches from potential en-
trepreneurs to performing joint due-diligence work on potential investment opportunities, ultimately reducing transaction costs
(Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; Paul and Whittam, 2010; Gregson et al., 2013; Lahti and Keinonen, 2016). These associations have
grown to regional, national (for instance, ACA in the US, BBAA in the UK, and IBAN in Italy), and even continental proportions
(among them, EBAN and BAE in Europe), increasingly differentiating among each other in terms of rules of engagement, internal
structure, quality, variety, and cost of the services provided. Thanks to BANs and AGs, the informal venture capital market is cur-
rently much more visible and, hence, easier to access on both the demand and supply sides (Mason, Botelho, and Harrison, 2013;
Cumming and Zhang, 2016).
Despite their growing sophistication and importance as capital providers, there is very little evidence on the impact of BANs on
the investment process of BAs. Most existing research is based on anecdotal evidence or case studies (May 2002; Payne et al.,
2002; Mason, 2006; Johnson and Sohl, 2012; Ibrahim, 2008; Brush et al., 2012; Kerr et al., 2014; Collewaert and Manigart,
2016; Croce et al., 2017).
In this study, we focus on BA investment choices, trying to isolate the differential role played by BAN or group membership on
BA investment practice. In particular, we investigate whether and how being members of semi-formal organizations affect the
share of angel personal wealth invested in a given deal or the amount of equity stake in portfolio companies. Looking at a unique
dataset that encompasses qualitative and quantitative information on 810 investments for 619 unique companies by 330 unique
Italian BAs from 2008 to 2014, our study, for the first time, provides evidence of significantly different investment practices by
angels who participate in BANs compared to unaffiliated angels investing as single, independent investors. We find that being
part of an angel network has a significant effect on investment practice, increasing angels' propensity to invest more of their
wealth. Furthermore, BAN membership generates sizeable diversification benefits for angels: a larger deal flow and access to net-
work screening and monitoring skills affect angel portfolios by reducing the individual stake in each company in a classical diver-
sification exercise. When we control for the possibility of co-investing within a BAN, both angel capital committed and investment
deal size decrease. Finally, BAN membership mitigates the effects on investment practices of certain angel-specific factors such as
post investment hands-off approach and non-contractual based monitoring.
Given the possible endogenous nature of the choice of joining an angel network, we perform a host of robustness checks in-
cluding a set of two-stage instrumental variable regressions and propensity score matching regressions. Results are qualitatively
unchanged, thereby providing support to our research design and our conclusions.
Our findings have interesting normative implications that may be useful for policymakers in creating new and effective mea-
sures aimed at stimulating entrepreneurship and contributing to the development and growth of economic and social systems
(Baldock and Mason, 2015; Kraemer-Eis et al., 2016).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the second section derives the research hypothesis to be tested from the
literature dealing with BAs and informal venture capital. The third section presents the dataset and specifies the variables used to
perform the empirical analysis, the results of which are shown and discussed in the fourth section. The final section addresses
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2. Hypothesis development and related literature
Our research program adopts as its main unit of analysis the amount of own risk capital invested by individual business angels.
Prior literature on both venture capitalists (Lerner, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000; Cumming and Johan, 2013) and informal investors
has commonly operationalized this measure as either the overall amount of capital invested (Maula et al., 2005; Wiltbank and
Boecker, 2007; Lahti, 2011; Collewaert and Manigart, 2016) or the amount invested in a single deal as a share of a given BA's per-
sonal wealth (Harrison and Mason, 2002; Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; De Gennaro and Dwyer, 2014; Landström and Mason, 2016).
These metrics try to capture the extent of the commitment of BAs to financing new ventures. In light of these results, in this
study, we adopt as a first metric, the percentage of wealth invested (“Wealth%”).
However, we believe that a second measure can provide insights useful for identifying the perceived risk drivers and their im-
pact on the asset allocation decisions of informal investors. Accordingly, following prior research referencing mainly private equity
and venture capital (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellman and Puri, 2002; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Cumming and Walz, 2010),
we add a second proxy for BA invested capital that measures the amount of capital invested as a share of the post-financing eq-
uity capital of the targeted company (“Participation%”).
Building on these measures as the main dependent variables, we develop the expected effects of BAN participation as follows.
2.1. BAN membership and investment decisions
One major evolutionary trend observed in the informal venture capital market over the past two decades addresses the grow-
ing relevance of associations of BAs, either structured or semi-structured, ranging from loose networks of individual investors toPlease cite this article as: Bonini, S., et al., Angel network affiliation and business angels' investment practices, J. Corp. Finance
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Lahti and Keinonen, 2016).
Despite such heterogeneity, the forms of association have converged towards two main forms: BANs and AGs. The main dif-
ference between these two forms is in the less stringent obligations and engagement rules for membership such as limited or
no fees, no minimum participation requirements, and no obligation to share due diligence costs (Mason, Botelho, and Harrison,
2013). BAN members can join through a solicited or unsolicited basis and collaborate in organizing pitching events, training,
and mentoring activities, and coordinated lobbying efforts. Entrepreneurs are solicited to submit their proposals to the BAN
through websites and other networking activities taking place inside the community. There is no (or limited) organized deal
group processing, and the association does not make investments or recommend investments to members; rather, each member
decides whether to invest on a deal-by-deal basis, typically finding co-investors (within or outside the BAN) and sharing due dil-
igence, negotiations, and term sheets.
In this study, we exploited data obtained from the Italian federation of business angel associations (IBAN), a trade association
that allows repeated sampling of a large pool of angels, obtaining reliable information via their affiliation to a network. In this re-
spect, the survey structure treats networks and groups as interchangeable. While we acknowledge the previously discussed dif-
ferences between these, we believe that our results extend to more structured and formal organizations, such as the AGs, thus,
widening this research stream.
A few recent papers have tried to shed more light on the investment practices of such associations. However, the research
methodologies have been restricted to case studies due to the lack of aggregate data. Kerr et al. (2014) exploit data provided
by two AGs to study their internal structures and investment practices. Following a similar approach, Collewaert and
Manigart (2016) and Croce et al. (2017) look at the type of services and contributions provided to the targeted companies,
whereas Mason (2008) and Paul and Whittam (2010) focus their attention on the advantages provided by the BAN to its
members. Ibrahim (2008), Brush et al. (2012), andMason, Botelho, and Harrison (2013) argue that being a BANmember ben-
efits the angel investor mainly through the information and knowledge sharing taking place inside the community. The pos-
sibility for less experienced angels to get in touch with more experienced angels is particularly important inside the BAN,
improving new investors' human capital and knowledge about how to implement effective value-creating investment deci-
sions (Shane, 2000). In addition, the role of so-called “gatekeepers,” individuals who control access to and manage much of
the day-to-day operations of the BAN (Paul and Whittam, 2010), is crucial in the sharing of information among BAN
members.
Therefore, investments made by BAN members, even if not in syndication with other co-investors, should be more informed
and efficient, leading to capital allocation decisions more focused on angel investments. In other words, because of the services
and contributions provided by the BAN to its members, we hypothesize that BAN members, once they have selected an invest-
ment opportunity and undertaken the investment decision-making process, will invest in companies belonging to this peculiar
asset class more of their personal wealth than non-BAN members.
Accordingly, we formulate our first research hypothesis as follows.
H1a. BAN membership has a positive impact on the share of the business angel's personal wealth invested in each deal.
BAs joining a BAN benefit from the deal flow disclosed inside the network and, therefore, are provided with a higher number
of investment opportunities compared to unaffiliated angels, leading to a higher number of deals.
However, given that the impact of BAN membership on BA investments should not necessarily lead to structural changes in
either their risk aversion or their historical asset allocation choices, at least in the short run, we expect that BAN members, in
order to maximize the benefit provided by the network in terms of both wider and better quality investment opportunities, offset
the increase in the number of deals with a decrease in the equity stake acquired in each single targeted company. Furthermore, as
pointed out by Sohl (2007), the deal flow process inside the angel network involves bigger sized companies due to the higher
equity capital injection potentially available than that for unaffiliated angel investors.
As such, an alternative research hypothesis to test is the following.
H1b. BANmembership has a negative impact on the size of business angels' equity stake acquired in a given target company.2.2. Co-investment, activism, monitoring, and investment decisions
Among the many options available to BAs when valuing a given investment opportunity, there is the possibility to make
the deal either as an individual investor—the “solo angel”—or to co-invest with other angel investors. The latter strategy can
be implemented through different degrees of formal structures ranging from formal angel syndicates to informal so-called
“club deals” and, more importantly, can significantly affect the amount of capital provided by each investor. On the one
hand, by co-investing in a given deal, investors can reduce their individual equity stakes in the target company while main-
taining active involvement and providing value-added contributions. In fact, the sum of the single equity positions of all of
the co-investors in a given deal increases the possibility of playing an active role in target companies, which can require
larger contributions than those available to solo angels (Paul and Whittam, 2010). On the other hand, consistent with mod-
ern portfolio theory (Elton and Gruber, 2005), the co-investment option is a completely rational diversification strategy
aimed at reducing the risk from a given equity investment opportunity. As a direct implication, BAs choosing to share thePlease cite this article as: Bonini, S., et al., Angel network affiliation and business angels' investment practices, J. Corp. Finance
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2002; Mason, Botelho, and Harrison, 2013), as well as from the possibility of gaining access to risk-reducing information
(Aernoudt, 2005).2
This leads to the following research hypothesis.
H2. Both the amount invested by the BA and the size of the equity stake in the angel-backed companies are negatively affected by
the numbers of co-investors in a given deal.
As previously discussed, BAs often exhibit interest in seeking active involvement with their portfolio companies to support
them in the value creation process through a hands-on approach. Politis (2008) identifies four different types of value-added con-
tributions coming from angel investors: a “sounding board” role, a “monitoring” role, a “resource acquisition” role, and a
“mentoring” role. However, a number of surveys disclosed on a yearly basis by research centers (EIF, OECD) and country federa-
tions of angel associations (IBAN, EBAN) report the existence of investors not willing and/or able to play such an “active” role in
the target companies. Rather, they are more attracted by potential capital gains and by the portfolio diversification benefits asso-
ciated with investing in such an asset class, normally uncorrelated with their security portfolios. Such “passive” investors may le-
verage the benefits offered by participating in a BAN and consequently exhibit a structurally different investment pattern.
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between passive investors and the amount invested among non-BAN members. In
contrast, for BAN members, the opportunity of either co-investing or benefiting from trust, information, and experience shared
inside the network could generate a possibly weaker negative outcome. This leads to the following research hypothesis:
H3. The intention to play a passive role in a given deal has a negative impact on BAs' investment decisions in terms of both the
amount invested and the size of their equity stakes. Such effect is stronger for non-BAN members.
The finance literature has extensively investigated the role of monitoring as a way to reduce asymmetric information and
moral hazard problems stemming from any type of securities investment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Diamond, 1984; Aghion
and Bolton, 1992).
As far as private equity investments are concerned, many scholars have investigated how institutional investors—venture cap-
ital organizations among them—monitor target companies and the major contingent contracts, clauses, and mechanisms used to
reduce potential conflicts and incentives for opportunistic behavior by entrepreneurs (Sahlman, 1990; Triantis, 2001; Kaplan and
Stromberg, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Chemmanur et al., 2008; Cumming, 2008; Wong et al., 2009; Cumming and Johan,
2013; Erenburg et al., 2016).
Dealing with BAs, specific contributions showed that they seldom adopt the typical control and governance provisions of ven-
ture capital investors (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Wiltbank and Boecker, 2007; Goldfarb et al., 2012; Bonini and Capizzi, 2017),
implementing monitoring mechanisms “non aggressive and striking in their informality” (Ibrahim, 2008). The major substitutes
for contractual monitoring are represented by angels' knowledge of the industry from previous investments or managerial expe-
rience, existing interactions with entrepreneurs, and geographic proximity with the target company (Wong et al., 2009).
Consistent with our previous arguments, we believe that the type of monitoring taking place in the informal venture capital
market is a “soft” one, not based mainly on contractual mechanisms but rather on close involvement in the relevant company
through company visits, interactions with entrepreneurs, and other control techniques based on trust. Therefore, similarly to
the well-known impact of “hard” contractual monitoring in the private equity industry, we expect that the higher the soft mon-
itoring effort, the lower the investment risk perception by BAs in their investment decision-making process.
Given the possibility to investigate the role of soft monitoring for both of our sub-samples of BAs—BAN members and non-BAN
members—we expect different magnitudes of the causal relationship between monitoring and angel investment. BAN members
benefit from the screening support provided by BANs to their members as well as from the information and knowledge sharing
effects stemming from inside the BAN, lessening the need for higher monitoring effort over investments that are perceived as
truly riskier. This leads to less informationally opaque investments when compared to those realized by non-BAN member BAs,
who do not benefit from the soft information produced inside the angel community and must compensate for greater information
asymmetry by imposing a higher level of soft-monitoring. In this case, higher monitoring should not necessarily be associated
with higher investment risk, but rather with the need for realigning the incentives of entrepreneurs and/or executive directors
of the target company.
We, therefore, hypothesize the following.
H4. BAs soft monitoring has a positive impact on their investment decisions in terms of both the amount invested and the size of
their equity stakes. This effect is stronger for non-BAN members.
2.3. Controls
Following the extant literature, we test our hypotheses introducing a set of control variables that are known to have a causal
effect on the investment decisions of BAs. Mason and Harrison (2000), Van Osnabrugge (2000), and Macht (2011) explained the
role of experience, whereas Shane (2000) and Paul et al. (2007) showed the effects of age, education, and previous background,2 Assuming that the share of their personal wealth devoted to investments in early-stage companies remains constant.
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et al., 2008; Collewaert and Manigart, 2016). Following Samuelson's (1997) and Forsfalt's (1999) results on intertemporal portfo-
lio choices, it is likely that BA risk aversion increases with age, leading to a decrease in the share of wealth allocated to early stage
ventures. In contrast, experience gained through past investments, education, and personal wealth could act as counterbalancing
factors on capital allocation investment decisions.
Additionally, we expect the equity stake in the target company acquired by a BA to be negatively affected by the size of the
company itself (Mason and Harrison, 2000; Van Osnabrugge, 2000), as well as by its stage in the life cycle (Wiltbank et al.,
2006), and its proximity to the BA (Sudek, 2006).
Finally, consistent with the above-mentioned contributions, we consider in our model industry fixed effects as well as time
fixed effects in order to take into account the role of both industry-specific features and time-varying macroeconomic variables
that may affect angel investment practices.
3. Sample data and variables
Our data are obtained from sequential surveys administered by the IBAN to its associates and other unaffiliated BAs. IBAN is
the national trade association for angels and angel groups/networks.
A known problem in BA research is estimating the “true” population. Some investors, in fact, strive for anonymity creating an
“invisible market” that is difficult to detect using simple survey techniques (Mason and Harrison, 2000; Landström and Mason,
2016). To circumvent this issue, IBAN adopted a strategy of integrating the “visible market”—represented by BAs and networks/
groups affiliated to IBAN—with an estimation of the “invisible” component. The estimation is done by supplementing traditional
“snowball sampling” (Schuessler, 1979)—based on the identification of people believed to be BAs through their connections with
the surveyed BAN members—with an inferential approach based on the results of a domestic research program (private equity
monitor, PEM) aimed at identifying and analyzing private equity and venture capital investor activity. PEM collects information
on PE and venture capital (VC)-backed companies. Focusing on the segment of VC-backed company investments, IBAN re-
searchers collected complete ownership data3 from the Bureau Van Dijk-AIDA and identified individual shareholders whose in-
vestment patterns were consistent with that of a BA (Mason 2006). In particular, researchers classified as BAs shareholders
that exhibited the following characteristics: repeated investment in new companies, non-executive role, and non-majority
ownership.
While acknowledging possible sample biases in the survey data, the rigorous sampling method and the repeated nature of the
survey over a seven-year period appear to be strong mitigating factors that justify confidence in the sample representativeness.
The survey structure is designed to collect information on the previous year's operations and is conducted through a four-step
process: at the beginning of January, IBAN forwards the survey's website link to its associates and other known or estimated BAs.4
Responses are collected by the first week of March (step 1). Non-responding BAs are contacted by email and phone to solicit sur-
vey completion (step 2) while an IBAN team reviews the data to identify incomplete, wrong, or unverifiable answers (step 3),
which are further checked through direct follow-up calls (step 4). This process is a common survey technique called sequential
mixed mode (Snjikers et al., 2013). Evidence shows that a mixed mode survey approach significantly improves the response
rate (De Leeuw, 2005; Dillman et al., 2009).
Survey statistics are reported in Table 1.
IBAN administered 3000 questionnaires to 929 affiliates and 2071 non-affiliates from 2009 (2008 investment data) through
2015 (2014 investment data).
The overall response rate over the full sample period was 41.7%. The response rate was higher (about 47.2%) for the sub-
sample of BAN members than for non-BAN members (39.2%), who are less likely to respond because of anonymity concerns or
possible erroneous estimated identification.
Out of the 1250 responses, the researchers discarded: a) surveys with material inconsistencies and b) surveys reporting zero
investment. This led to a final sample of 439 responses reporting an aggregate of 810 deals, for 619 unique companies, by 330
unique investors during the 2008 to 2014 time period. BAN membership was acceptably balanced (246 vs. 193 or 56% vs.
44%), a desirable feature when conducting empirical tests on the differential network affiliation role on BA investment practices.
In Table 2, we present the temporal and industry distribution of the final sample data distinguishing BAN from non-BAN re-
spondents through a dummy variable (BAN_membership) taking a value of one for BAN members.
The investment distribution is reported in Panel A. We observe a large drop in reported investments the last two years of the
sample. This figure is the result of a tightening of the survey exclusion conditions highlighted above following the transition of
IBAN to a new gatekeeper. Although this problem is certainly a potential concern, we believe that the validity of our results
will be only limitedly affected because in all of our regressions we introduce year fixed effects, which absorb a significant portion
of such heterogeneity.
Looking at the industry distribution of investments reported in Panel B, deals are spread out across several industries, with an
unsurprising dominance of “traditional” sectors for early stage investments, such as information and communication technology
(ICT), electronics, and biotech, which collectively attract approximately half of the aggregate investments. Interestingly, a3 Italy, as numerous European countries, requires a relatively high level of disclosure of financial and ownership information that is publicly available through the
government and third-party sources such as BVD-Aida.
4 See the IBAN website (www.iban.it) for the survey questionnaire.
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Table 1
IBAN Survey - Sample coverage and response rates
This table report sample coverage and repsonse rates for our survey data. The first column reports the number of surveys administered over the period 2008–2014. The
second column reports thenumber of surveys received after the follow-up roundsdescribed in section 3; the third column reports thenumber of surveys that have been
kept after discarding: a) surveys withmaterial inconsistencies and b) surveys reporting zero investments; the fourth column indicates the number of deals reported by
the survey respondents; given that the same investor can be surveydmultiple times and the same companies cna be invested bymore tha one angel in thefifth and sixth
column we finally report the number of unique investors and unique companies.
Surveys sent Surveys received Final surveys sample # of deals reported Unique investors Unique companies
Overall sample 3000 1250 (41.7%) 439 (14.6%) 810 330 619
BAN members 929 438 (47.2%) 246 (26.5%) 438 150 334
Non-BAN members 2071 812 (39.2%) 193 (9.3%) 372 180 285
6 S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxmeaningful 13% of investment is directed at cleantech-related ventures, consistent with a rising global trend of activity in this
market. BAN membership affects industry distribution as indicated by the Pearson Chi-squared test. Non-BAN members seem
to invest less in ICT companies, allocating more resources to biotech and media-related investments.
Data reported in Panel C show that investors have portfolio sizes ranging from one investment to N10, without a clear prev-
alence of any portfolio cluster. Interestingly, there is a strong difference when controlling for BAN membership. Whereas almost
50% of BAN members have portfolios in excess of five companies, this is true for only 18% of non-BAN members (Chi-squared
32.02, p b .001). This evidence provides preliminary support for our argument about the structural effects of BAN membership
on the investment behavior of BAs.Table 2
Sample distribution
This table reports summary statistics of the investment sample. Panel A reports the year distribution of the investments for the overall sample and by BANmembership
status. Panel B reports the industry distribution of the investments for the overall sample and by BANmembership status. Panel C reports the portfolio size distribution
of the angels included in the sample.
PANEL A – Year distribution
Year Investments Percentage
Whole sample BAN members Non-BAN members
2008 95 62.11% 37.89%
2009 142 59.86% 40.14%
2010 137 62.04% 37.96%
2011 159 63.52% 36.48%
2012 162 30.25% 69.75%
2013 58 63.79% 36.21%
2014 57 38.60% 61.40%
Total 810 54.07% 45.93%
PANEL B – Industry distribution
Industry Percentage
Whole sample BAN members Non-BAN members
Biotech 17.06% 15.44% 18.97%
Cleantech 13.08% 12.90% 13.28%
Commerce and distribution 10.09% 12.44% 7.32%
Electronics 9.34% 12.90% 5.15%
Financial services 3.36% 4.15% 2.44%
Food & beverage 2.86% 3.00% 2.71%
ICT (SW and HW, app web and mobile) 20.80% 17.05% 25.20%
Mechanical engineering 7.47% 8.53% 6.23%
Media & entertainment 9.96% 8.76% 11.38%
Telecommunications & similar services 2.86% 2.53% 3.25%
Textile & apparel 3.11% 2.30% 4.07%
χ2 32.08***
PANEL C – Angels investment intensity
Business angel total deals Percentage
Whole sample BAN members Non-BAN members
N10 17.90% 18.26% 9.13%
6–10 26.05% 28.32% 9.14%
2–5 33.46% 35.16% 51.34%
1 22.59% 18.26% 20.38%
χ2 (portfolio N 5) 32.02***
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Table 3
Dependent variables: summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for two dependent variables: Wealth% is measured as the amount of capital invested as a share of the individual business angel's
personalwealth; Participation% is the amount of capital invested by an individual business angel expressed as a share of the equity capital of the investee company. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively for one-tailed t-test for means and Wilcoxon ranksum z-test for medians.
Dependent variable =Wealth% Total sample BAN members Non-BAN members
Mean 15.48 17.09*** 13.67
Median 14 14*** 8
Maximum 60 60 60
Minimum 5 5 5
Standard deviation 11.8 13.13 9.8
Observation 669 354 315
Dependent variable = Participation%
Mean 14.74 14.87 14.59
Median 8 8*** 4
Maximum 100 100 100
Minimum 1 1 1
Standard deviation 19.54 18.3 20.93
Observation 808 436 372
7S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxTable 3 reports summary statistics on participation in groups and networks and the conditional distribution of the two depen-
dent variables:Wealth%, which is the share of a BA's financial wealth invested in all BA-like deals and Participation%, which is com-
puted as the amount invested in a venture as a share of the venture's equity capital.
The descriptive statistics related to the dependent variables show that the relative incidence of BA investment varies widely in
the sample in terms of both participation in the venture and the personal wealth of the BA.5 Looking at the percentage of wealth
invested, we noticed a significant difference conditional on BAN members. BAN members, on average, invest 24% (p b .01) more of
their disposable wealth in new ventures than their non-BAN peers. Remarkably, this figure is affected by large values observed in
the non-BAN member subsample, as shown by the significant difference in medians (14 vs. 8). This difference becomes less robust
when testing the second dependent variable. BAN members seem to invest more in each single venture, but the means are not
significantly different from zero. The medians, however, are significant, suggesting the presence of a few extremely small values
in the BAN member sub-sample.
Table 4 describes the proxies used to operationalize the main dependent variables and controls, and presents the summary
statistics.
Co-investor data are winsorized at the 95% level due to the presence of extreme observations that are most likely due to data
entry errors. The figures show that co-investments are frequent, with an average (median) number of co-investors of 4.3 (2),
which yields an unconditional number of investors on any deal equal to five or more. Unreported percentiles show that N70%
of the investments have at least one co-investor and nine or more investors back 25% of the deals. This behavior is sharply dif-
ferent from that exhibited by formal venture capitalists, who on average syndicate their deals with a very limited number of ad-
ditional investors due to coordination problems and conflicts of interest characterizing large syndicates (Lerner, 1994; Manigart
et al., 2006; Tian, 2012).
Leveraging a specific question in the survey, we address and test our third research hypothesis by modeling a dummy variable
(Passive Investor) that takes a value of one if the respondent states that the investment decision was driven exclusively by capital
gain motivation and not by other private benefit reasons that would suggest the willingness to play an active role in the target
company.
The survey also offers evidence regarding the role played by BAs in the monitoring of the target firms, allowing us to test the
last research hypothesis (H4). We built an ordinal variable (Soft-Monitoring) that graduates the frequency of the visits a BA made
to a target venture, from one to five, where one means very limited involvement (no or very few visits) and five means very high
involvement (a constant presence at the firm). Although the survey collects this information ex post, asking about the effective
involvement in the invested firms by BAs, we believe that they already know the future degree of involvement in a venture at
the time that the investment decision is made. Moreover, this self-declared willingness is likely that it influences the amount
invested. In particular, a higher degree of monitoring is expected to decrease the investment risk perceived by a BA. As a conse-
quence, we are reasonably confident that the variable Soft-Monitoring successfully captures the degree of monitoring effort esti-
mated when the investment decision was made. Following our hypothesis, we expect a positive sign for this variable,
particularly for non-BAN members, given their larger concerns regarding information asymmetry underlying their investments
compared to BAN members.
Turning to angel-specific control variables, Age, Low Education, and Wealth are self-reported demographic items obtained from
specific survey items. An additional survey item required angels to identify his/her prevalent background outside the portfolio
companies. Responses identify managerial and entrepreneurial backgrounds as opposed to a coarse group of other jobs. We
have accordingly modeled three dummies: Entrepreneur, Manager, and Other. In all of our tests, we will assume “Other” as the5 Notably, a recent research commissioned by the Europea Union and based on a survey of a sample of European angels obtained comparable figures: survey partic-
ipants reported that, on average, BA investments represents 10% of their wealth (Inova+, 2017).
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Table 4
Independent variables: descriptive statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics of the main independent variables and three sets of Angel-specific, firm-specific andmarket-wide controls. The variables Co-in-
vestors, Wealth and Net asset Value are winsorized at the 95% level.
Description Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Dummy
= 1
percentage
BAN_membership Dummy = 1 if the BA is a BAN member 810 – – – – – 54.1
Co-investors Number of co-investors 809 4.3 2 4.99 0 15 –
Passive investor Dummy =1 if the investment is exclusively driven by
capital gain motivations
668 – – – – – 22
Soft-monitoring Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 means
monitoring very low or absent and 5 means monitoring
very high, with a constant presence in the firm
668 2.75 2 1.12 1 5 –
Angel specific controls
Age Age of the BA 668 48.32 45 9.4 28 71 –
Education Dummy = 1 if the BA holds a high school diploma or a
lower educational qualification
668 – – – – – 6.7
Wealth (in euro) BAs' financial wealth in the year of the investment 669 1,480,682 1250,000 1,515,290 250,000 7,500,000 –
Entrepreneur Dummy = 1 in case of prevalent working occupation as
entrepreneur (excluding his/her involvment in the invested
companies)
668 – – – – – 37.7
Manager Dummy =1 in case of prevalent working occupation as
manager (excluding his/her involvment in the invested
companies)
668 – – – – – 16.8
Experience Number of BA’ investments in lifetime 668 6.36 7 4.01 0 26 –
Firm specific controls
Net_Asset_Value
(in euro/th.)
Enterprises' net asset value in the year of the BA's
investment (pre-money)
806 1389.67 497.70 2281.66 20.08 8928.57 –
Seed Dummy = 1 if the BA has invested in a seed enterprise 810 – – – – – 35.7
Foreign Dummy = 1 if the BA has invested in a foreign enterprise 711 – – – – – 12.1
Industry controls
Industry PBV Industry price-to-book value, in the investment year 810 3.05 2.67 1.36 0.71 8.62 –
Net capex/sales Industry net capital assets to sales, in the investment year 810 0.8 −0.16 3.18 −4.47 22.96 –
8 S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxbaseline to highlight the differential effect of a specific background on the investment behavior of business angels. Experience is
modeled as the number of investments made in the past, consistent with Hsu et al. (2014) and Capizzi (2015). More experienced
BAs should exhibit greater investment selection skills identifying superior investment opportunities. Their successful track records
can induce greater self-confidence, thereby increasing the size of their investments relative to less experienced angels. We expect
to observe this effect for both dependent variables.
Looking at firm-specific control variables, we obtain Net_Asset_Value from a survey item where respondents were required to
indicate the net asset value at the time of (but prior to) their investment. Firms fit the profile of newly funded companies with
average (median) assets of approximately 1.4 m/euro (0.5). Given the existence of a few, very large outliers, we winsorized the
data at the 95% level. The minimum value of 20,000 euro, and, more generally, the (unreported) lowest decile asset values indi-
cate that BAs invest in a non-negligible number of companies that are most likely paper companies or newly formed shell vehicles
with essentially no assets. This evidence supports the view that BAs provide much needed funding to companies in stages of their
life cycle that would hardly elicit interest from formal VC. This view is corroborated by the standard deviation and maximum
value figures, which return a view of the angel-backed companies being very small and young. Our statistics are consistent
with previous studies on BA activity in Italy (Croce et al., 2017) and other countries such as the US (DeGennaro and Dwyer,
2014; Lerner et al., 2018), Belgium (Collewaert and Manigart, 2016), Canada (Carpentier and Suret, 2015), China (Li et al.,
2014), and Finland (Lahti, 2011).
Approximately 36% of the investments mapped in the dataset are directed at projects in the Seed phase. In the other cases, the
target firms are start-ups or later stage investments. Because investing in a seed enterprise is likely to be riskier than investing in
a well-established entrepreneurial project, there is a negative expected relationship between the dummy Seed and both depen-
dent variables, Wealth% and Participation%.
Dealing with the geographic location of the target companies, foreign ventures represent only 12% of the financed projects.
Cumming and Dai (2010) show that venture capitalists have a preference for investments that are closer to them. Distance is
measured from a geographical perspective but is argued to also be a proxy for cultural and social differences. Following these ar-
guments, we expect a negative sign for the survey dummy Foreign, which identifies investments by an angel in a country other
than his/her country of residence.
Looking at the financial wealth of BAs, the minimum reported value is 250,000 euro, the lowest end of the survey brackets.
This figure is smaller than the level adopted in the US to identify accredited investors, a condition of operating as a BA in the
US. However, this concern is mitigated by the fact that there is no specific minimum wealth requirement under Italian – and,Please cite this article as: Bonini, S., et al., Angel network affiliation and business angels' investment practices, J. Corp. Finance
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.12.029
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(1.25) and the highest decile in excess of 3.5 million euro. These figures are consistent with the reported values in individual
wealth and deal size of other empirical analyses investigating BAs in different countries as well as in the US (Collewaert and
Manigart, 2016; De Gennaro and Dwyer, 2014; EBAN, 2015; Inova+, 2017; Kerr et al., 2014; Lahti, 2011; Mason, Harrison, and
Botelho, 2013; Sohl, 2007; Wiltbank et al., 2009).
Because our data are collected annually and there is no disclosure about the month of investment, we account for economic
conditions and the equity-market performance through year fixed-effects. Finally, we add a set of industry controls that have
been shown to drive the overall volume of investments. In particular, we control for industry-specific characteristics through
the industry price-to-book value ratio (Industry_PBV) and the industry capital intensity (Capital Intensity), measured as the ratio
of capital expenditures to sales.
4. Methodology and results
4.1. Personal wealth invested
The first analysis investigates the determinants of the share of personal wealth invested in a venture by a BA. To this end, we
run a battery of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions between the dependent variable WEALTH% and a set of explanatory var-
iables related to the venture, the investor, and the investment decision. We also add to some model specifications time and in-
dustry fixed effects. We address potential heteroskedasticity concerns in two ways: first, because our dependent variable and
the main continuous independent variables cannot assume negative values, we perform a logarithmic transformation of the de-
pendent variable and of the explanatory variables Net_Asset_Value, Wealth, and Experience6; second, we compute Huber-White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Our baseline Eq. (1) is a fully balanced model with time fixed effects.6 Bec
experie
Plea
(201y ¼ α þ β1x1 þ β2x2 þΦFirmControlsþ ΓIndustryControlsþ τ þ θþ ε ð1Þwhere:y ¼Wealth%
x1 ¼ BAN membership
x2 ¼ Co‐investors
FirmControls ¼ Net Asset Value; Seed; Foreign
IndustryControls ¼ Industry PBV;Net capex=Sale
τ ¼ Year of investment
θ ¼ IndustryEq. (2) adds to the previous model investor-level explanatory variables.y ¼ α þ β1x1 þ β2x2 þ β1x1 þ β3x3 þ β4x4 þ ΛInvestorControlsþΦFirmControlsþ ΓIndustryControlsþ τ þ θþ ε ð2Þwhere:x1 ¼ BAN membership
x2 ¼ Co‐investors
x3 ¼ Passive Investor
x4 ¼ Soft‐Monitoring
InvestorControls ¼ Age;Education;Wealth;Entrepreneur;Manager; ExperienceBecause the two-group mean comparison test on the dependent variable Wealth%, presented in Table 3, shows that being a
member of an angel community affects the share of wealth invested in a venture, we also run Eq. (2) for the sub-samples of
BAN members and non-BAN members separately.
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis. The model is significant in all of the specifications and shows an R-squared of 14%
for the base model in column (1) and above 35% for the two angel sub-samples, reported in columns 3 and 4.
The results show that being a member of an angel community increases the share of wealth invested by approximately 16%,
which provides support for our first research hypothesis (H1a). Other conditions being equal, a one-unit increase in the number
of co-investors reduces the percentage amount of BAs' personal wealth invested in a single deal by 2%. However, by comparing
BAN members with non-BAN members, we observe some interesting differences, highlighting the differential role played by
co-investing in the investment decision. More specifically, the BAs' wealth allocation is affected by the presence of co-investors
only for the sub-sample of the BAN members, implying that there could be a positive effect played by the trust established inside
a given angel community. We interpret the absence of an effect for non-BAN members as the result of a lack of knowledge ofause experiencemay take a value of 0, the transformation is done as ln(experience+ 1). We also perform an alternative transformation taking the cube root of
nce and using it in a set of robustness regressions, obtaining qualitatively similar results.
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Table 5
Regression Results (dependent variable:Wealth%)
This table reports OLS regressions on the effects of BANmembership on angels' asset allocation decisions. The dependent variable, Wealth%, is the share of one angel's
wealth invested in each BA-backd company. Eq. (1) estimates a fully balanced model with time and industry fixed-effect. Eq. (2) includes all the explanatory variables
described in Table 2. We also run Eq. (2) for the two sub-samples originated by grouping BAs on the basis of the BAN_membership dummy (Models 3 and 4). Huber-
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Whole sample BAN Member Non-BAN member
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
BAN_membership 0.125** 0.155***
(0.05) (0.05)
Co-investors −0.021*** −0.017*** −0.035*** −0.007
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Passive Investor −0.064 −0.023 −0.163**
(1.08) (0.25) (2.08)
Soft-Monitoring 0.054* −0.053 0.154***
(1.92) (1.62) (4.60)
Age −0.015*** −0.011*** −0.018***
(5.70) (3.02) (3.91)
Education 0.031 0.19 −0.213**
(0.40) (1.56) (2.02)
Wealth −0.062** −0.044 −0.114***
(2.09) (1.00) (3.21)
Experience 0.041*** 0.059*** 0.030***
(6.57) (5.82) (3.51)
Entrepreneur 0.098* 0.053 0.158**
(1.90) (0.72) (2.37)
Manager 0.071 0.300*** −0.098
(1.17) (2.81) (1.36)
Net_Asset_Value 0.000 0.004 −0.013 0.031
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Seed 0.021 −0.074 −0.038 −0.170**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Foreign −0.009 −0.007 0.018 0.041
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09)
Industry P/BV 0.039 0.028 0.037 −0.004
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Capital intensity 0.006 0.011 −0.001 0.028
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Intercept 1.966*** 2.826*** 2.846*** 3.234***
(0.27) (0.34) (0.57) (0.43)
YEAR F.E YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES YES YES
R2 0.14 0.27 0.35 0.37
Observations 570 569 292 277
10 S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxother investors' profiles and characteristics. Such opaqueness may lead investors to avoid or reduce their co-investments because
of potential freeriding and/or opportunistic behavior risks. These results confirm our second hypothesis for an angel investor
member of a network and provide interesting novel evidence of the differential investment practices of BAs within and outside
of a BAN.
Confirming our third hypothesis, we find a negative relationship with percentage wealth invested for BAs acting as passive in-
vestors. Such a relationship, however, is statistically significant only for non-BAN member angels. We argue that, in the case of
BAN members, the possibility of benefitting from co-investing with other angels, the possibility of leveraging other angels' expe-
rience, and the mentoring and information provided by the BAN gatekeepers may provide incentives that ultimately positively
affect the investment decisions of passive angels interested mainly in capital gains, as highlighted by industry and association sur-
veys (OECD, EBAN, IBAN).
The variable Soft-Monitoring shows a positive significant sign for the group of BAs not affiliated with an angel community and
a negative sign for the BAN members, though the parameter is not significant. This evidence is consistent with H4 and seems to
be further proof of the quality of the contribution in terms of the deal flow and screening provided by BA networks to their mem-
bers. In fact, it is likely that BAN members impose a higher level of monitoring only on ventures that are more opaque. If this is
true, the negative sign is related to the perceived investment risk (which requires more monitoring). In contrast, because non-
BAN members do not benefit from the soft information provided by angel communities, they probably compensate for this greater
information asymmetry by imposing a high level of monitoring more extensively. In this case, higher monitoring is not necessarily
associated with higher risk. In fact, looking at the preferred asset class chosen, the earlier the stage in the life cycle of the target
firms – emerging by considering the significance of the control variable SEED – the lower the amount invested by non-BAN mem-
bers, who arguably tend to invest more in ventures with shorter time to market.Please cite this article as: Bonini, S., et al., Angel network affiliation and business angels' investment practices, J. Corp. Finance
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11S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxLooking at the set of control variables, the percentage amount of BAs' personal wealth invested in a single venture depends on
the personal characteristics of the BA, whereas it is not influenced by almost any of the target firms' characteristics, except for the
investment stage variable Seed.
First, we find a negative and significant parameter for the Wealth variable. However, breaking down the analysis between BAN
members and unaffiliated angels, we show that the evidence holds only for non-BAN members. This result lends support to the
notion that BAN membership offers valuable services to angels that provide incentives to invest more. Such services translate into
a powerful incentive to investing. In other words, wealthier non-BAN members will allocate less of their own capital to early stage
investments, possibly due to the absence of the benefits available to BAN members (high quality deal flow, risk-reduction, co-
investment, information sharing, decreased need for soft monitoring).
BAs' backgrounds play an opposite role conditional on BANmembership: former managers are keener to invest more if they par-
ticipate in a BAN group, whereas entrepreneurs tend to invest more of their personal wealth when they go solo. This is not inconsis-
tent with anecdotal evidence on the generally more independent investment profile of former, successful entrepreneurs, as opposed
to high-caliber managers used to acting within organizations.
Interestingly, we observe different investment behaviors between BAN members and non-BAN members when the education
of the investor is considered. Non-BAN members invest substantially less than similarly educated but affiliated angel investors. We
interpret this evidence as an indication that the information and knowledge sharing effect taking place inside a community can
compensate for the limited education of a given angel investor who otherwise would have been prevented from investing
more capital.Table 6
Regression Results (dependent variable: Participation%)
This table reports OLS regressions on the effects of BAN membership on angels' asset allocation decisions. The dependent variable, Participation %, is the amount
invested in a venture as a share of the investee net-asset-value. Eq. (1) estimates a fully balanced model with time and industry fixed-effect. Eq. (2) includes all the
explanatory variables described in Table 2.We also run Eq. (2) for the two sub-samples originated bygroupingBAs on the basis of the BAN_membership dummy (Model
3 and 4). Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Whole sample BAN member Non-BAN member
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
BAN_membership −0.163** −0.139*
(0.07) (0.07)
Co-investors −0.089*** −0.067*** −0.075*** −0.069***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Passive investor −0.186** −0.262** −0.264***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.09)
Soft-monitoring 0.214*** 0.116** 0.287***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Age −0.009** −0.007 −0.014*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.340** 0.536*** 0.136
(0.13) (0.19) (0.18)
Wealth 0.044 0.053 0.084
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Experience 0.019** 0.032** 0.017
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Entrepreneur 0.356*** 0.350*** 0.348***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
Manager 0.335*** 0.547*** 0.228*
(0.10) (0.17) (0.13)
Net_Asset_Value −0.226*** −0.250*** −0.268*** −0.211***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Seed −0.06 −0.135* −0.058 −0.212*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Foreign −0.342*** −0.321*** −0.292* −0.398**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.15)
Industry P/BV −0.042 −0.052 −0.033 −0.098
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Capital intensity 0.023 0.024 0.047* 0
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Intercept 4.203*** 3.675*** 4.036*** 3.373***
(0.33) (0.45) (0.66) (0.64)
YEAR F.E YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES YES YES
R2 0.49 0.56 0.51 0.67
Observations 700 569 292 277
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The second part of the empirical analysis explores the factors affecting the amount invested by the BA as a share of the post-
financing equity capital of the venture. For this purpose, we estimate the relationship between the dependent variable Participa-
tion% and the same set of explanatory variables used in Table 5.
Similarly to the approach used for the dependent variable Wealth%, we manage heteroskedasticity, first, by performing a log-
arithmic transformation of the dependent variable Participation% and of the explanatory variables Net_Asset_Value, Wealth, and Ex-
perience; and second, by estimating Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Table 6 presents the results of the OLS regressions run on Eqs. (1) and (2), replacing the dependent variable Wealth% with Par-
ticipation%.
In contrast to the univariate tests in Table 3, when controlling for a number of covariates, BAN membership returns significant
parameter estimates, indicating that it is a material factor affecting the capital allocation decisions of BAs. BAs are cognizant of the
risks of their investments, and, thus, they rationally manage their risk exposure by exploiting the benefits of affiliating to an angel
network. In particular, other conditions being equal, BAN membership reduces the size of the equity stake in the investee venture
by approximately 14%, which provides support for hypothesis H1b.
Our tests also provide support for H2 investing alongside another angel decreases the individual participation by an econom-
ically significant 7%; therefore, co-investing appears to be an effective way to pursue risk-minimizing investment decisions while
enjoying the upside of portfolio diversification.
On the other hand, when the main motivation appears to be capital gain (i.e., when the dummy Passive_Investor is equal to
one), the dependent variable shows an 18% reduction, consistent with H3.
Dealing with H4, the data show that the share of participation in a given target company increases by N20% as the degree of
soft monitoring increases, once again confirming the relevance of monitoring mechanisms, even if non-contractual based, as is
usually agreed upon between entrepreneurs and BAs (Ibrahim, 2008). This effect is markedly different across the two groups.
The parameter for BAN members is 0.116, whereas that for unaffiliated angels is 0.287. This difference is significant at the 1%
level, as computed through a (unreported) standardized Z-test.
Looking at angel-specific control variables, the model results display a progressive reduction in the amount invested in a ven-
ture as the age of the investor increases. It also emerges that less-educated BAs show greater risk exposure. The parameter esti-
mate for the degree of experience in BA investments is positive, as expected, although the statistical significance of the estimate is
very low or null. The absolute level of financial wealth is not significantly different from zero. On the contrary, we obtain strongly
significant estimates supporting the impact of prior experience as an entrepreneur or a manager on the magnitude of the stake
acquired by the angel. This effect is quantitatively similar across the two groups for angels showing prior experience as entrepre-
neurs but is significantly larger for BAN members with a managerial background. Looking at firm-specific controls, not surpris-
ingly, we find a significant inverse relationship between the size of the company measured through the Net Asset Value metric
and the share of participation in a venture. Similarly, as expected, participation diminishes by N30% if the target company is lo-
cated abroad.
4.3. Endogeneity
Our results, thus far, show that BAN membership affects BA investment practices. This is robust to time and industry fixed-
effects that control for any time-invariant and industry-specific variables, and to a host of controls that have been previously iden-
tified by the literature to determine capital investments by BAs. However, it is possible that our results are driven by endogeneity
in the form of reverse causality and/or simultaneity and sample selection. Given the absence of natural experiments, we address
the first possible source of endogeneity by performing a set of instrumental variable regressions and address selectivity biases by
running regressions on a treatment group of BAN members matched by propensity scores with a control group of otherwise sim-
ilar non-BAN members.
4.3.1. Two-stage least-squares IV regression
The survey nature of the data constrains the selection of usable instruments for variables not included in the main regressions.
We identify in the survey two additional variables that are plausibly exogenous to the amount invested, except through their re-
lation to our BAN membership variables of interest, and therefore allow us to run two-stage least square instrumental variable
regressions. Specifically, we select the following variables: the presence of a given investor in previous surveys (“Past surveys”)
and the number of investments evaluated (but not necessarily financed) by the respondent prior to the current survey (“Past
projects”).
The rationale for the two instruments is that a very active angel (i.e., one that responded to past prior surveys and one that
evaluated many projects) is more likely to appreciate the benefits of BAN membership and eventually join the network. At the
same time, however, it is unlikely that such actions anticipate a change in investment practices two or more years in the future.
The two instruments are uncorrelated with each other (ρ= 0.04) and the first-stage regression results reported in Table 7
support the instrument choice. The two instruments are strongly and positively correlated with BAN membership. The regressors
are correlated with the possibly endogenous variable as shown by the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test that strongly rejects the null
of no correlation. The weak identification test shows an F-value of 31.10, which compares favorably with the Stock-Yogo 10% crit-
ical value of 19.93, suggesting that the instruments are not weak.Please cite this article as: Bonini, S., et al., Angel network affiliation and business angels' investment practices, J. Corp. Finance
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Table 7
Instrumental Variable regression
In this table we present results of Instrumental Variable regressions to control for endogeneity where we instrument the potentially endogenous variables BANmem-
bership with two variables: “Past surveys” that captures the presence of a given investor in previous surveys and “Past projects” that captures the number of invest-
ments evaluated (but not necessarily financed) by the respondent prior to the current survey. Column 1 reports results for the first-stage regression, Column 2 for
the Instrumental Variable regression. The dependent variable in the first stage regression is BAN membership, while the dependent variable in the IV regression are
Tables 5 and 6 dependent variables (Wealth % and Participation%) respectively. Both first and second stage regressions include angel-specific, firm-specific and indus-
try-specific controls described in Table 4. All regressions include year and industryfixed-effects. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Durbin-Wu-Hausman test p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Wealth % Participation %
Dependent variable First stage regression IV regression First stage regression IV regression
BAN membership 0.362** −0.356*
(0.16) (0.20)
Past surveys 0.359*** 0.359***
(0.05) (0.05)
Past projects 0.024** 0.024***
(0.01) (0.01)
Coinvestor −0.013*** −0.017*** −0.013*** −0.056***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 0.01
Passive investor −0.082 −0.042 −0.082 −0.307***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
Soft-monitoring 0.066*** −0.013 0.066*** 0.221***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Angel-specific controls YES YES YES YES
Firm-specific controls YES YES YES YES
Industry specific controls YES YES YES YES
Year F.E. YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E. YES YES YES YES
N 431 431 431 431
Underidentification test
(Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic) 57.75*** 57.75***
Weak identification test
Cragg Donald Wald F-test 31.10 31.10
Stock-Yogo 10% critical value 19.93 19.93
Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity test (1.68) (0.86)
13S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxThe coefficients for the second-stage regression are consistent with the OLS results for both variables in terms of significance
and sign and are larger in terms of magnitude. Interestingly, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that BAN mem-
bership is endogenous.
Overall, these results indicate that our main results are robust and our conclusions on the effects of BAN membership
plausible.4.3.2. Propensity-score matching regressions
In our research design, we observe the investment decisions of angels that may or may not belong to a BAN. A critical concern
with this approach is that the sample may not be properly randomized, namely, it may not be representative of the population,
and therefore, results may be biased. In our case, the decision to join the BAN might be driven by the specific investment that an
angel is considering. Given that the variable suspected to generate selection bias is binary, a solution to this problem is to match
each treated observation (i.e., BAN member) to a specific control observation (i.e., non-BAN member) with similar characteristics.
We, therefore, perform a set of regressions after matching observations of BAN members with observations of non-BAN members
selected by propensity-score matching (PSM) based on the following variables: age, education, wealth, prior investment experi-
ence, background, and year of investment. Results obtained using the “nearest neighbor” score-matching algorithm7
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) are reported in Table 8.
Panel A presents post-estimation matching diagnostics. As required, the covariates do not exhibit significant difference in the
means with the exception of Manager and Year. However, these are both discrete variables and t-tests results are less problem-
atic. Looking at percentage bias, it is well below both the 10 and 5% conventional levels, with the exception of the same two var-
iables. The overall model bias drops from 10.6 to 2.5% suggesting that the matching strategy achieves acceptably balanced results.
As a (unreported) robustness test we have repeated the tests excluding the two poor variables from the covariates list. Results are
marginally more robust and qualitatively unchanged.
Panel B presents matched regression results. The sign, magnitude, and significance of the parameter estimates in both speci-
fications are qualitatively similar to those obtained in both the OLS and the 2SLS IV regressions. To ensure that our results were
not driven by the specific matching technique we repeated our tests by adopting alternatively: k-neighbor matching with k= 27 Given that a 1:1 nearest neighbor matching might yield matches with very different scores, we impose a maximum distance of half a standard deviation between
the treated and the matched observations.
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Table 8
Propensity score matching
This table reports OLS regressions on the effects of BANmembership on angels' asset allocation decisions using propensity score matched observations. The treatment
group is given by BAN affiliated angels whereas the control group is obtained by propensity score matching based on the following observable covariates: age, educa-
tion,wealth, prior investment experience, background, and year of investment. Panel A reports after-matching diagnostics. Difference inmeans between treatment and
control group is reported conventionally by the control groupmean. Panel B reports regression results. The dependent variable inModel 1 isWealth %, the share of one
angel's wealth invested in each BA-backed company. The dependent variable in Model 2 is Participation %, the amount invested in a venture as a share of the investee
net-asset-value. Regressions include angel-specific, firm-specific and industry-specific controls described in Table 4. All regressions include year and industry fixed-ef-
fects. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
PANEL A - After-matching diagnostics
Treatment Control % bias
Age 48.27 48.244 0.2
Education 0.06 0.07 −2.5
Wealth (log) 6.89 6.87 0.8
Experience 6.52 6.55 −0.6
Entrepreneur 0.39 0.35 7.9
Manager 0.14 0.21* −11.5
Year 2011 2011** −14.7
Mean Bias before matching 10.6
Mean bias after matching 2.5
PANEL B - PSM regressions
Independent variables Wealth % Participation%
(1) (2)
BAN_membership 0.145*** −0.143*
(0.05) (0.07)
Co-investors −0.017*** −0.066***
(0.01) (0.01)
Passive investor −0.068 −0.195**
(0.06) (0.08)
Soft-monitoring 0.058** 0.215***
(0.03) (0.04)
Angel-specific controls YES YES
Firm-specific controls YES YES
Industry specific controls YES YES
Intercept 2.645*** 3.656***
(0.33) (0.47)
Year F.E. YES YES
Industry F.E. YES YES
R2 0.28 0.56
Observations 561 561
Age −0.014*** −0.009**
(0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.193* 0.352*
(0.11) (0.18)
Wealth −0.036 0.052
(0.03) (0.04)
Experience 0.053*** 0.033***
(0.01) (0.01)
Entrepreneur 0.059 −0.195***
(0.05) (0.02)
Manager 0.076 −0.033
(0.07) (0.08)
Net_Asset_Value 0.042** −0.135
(0.02) (0.08)
Seed −0.084 −0.064
(0.06) (0.06)
Foreign 0.002 0.036*
(0.07) (0.02)
Industry P/BV −0.015 0.333***
(0.04) (0.07)
Capital intensity −0.008 0.360***
(0.01) (0.10)
14 S. Bonini et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2018) xxx–xxxand k= 3 and radius matching. We also matched on firm-specific covariates, even if this led to significant reduction in sample
size. Results were unchanged.
While conclusively ruling out endogeneity concerns in survey data is challenging, we believe that the coherence of the main
OLS results with the IV and PSM tests provides robust support for our conclusions.Please cite this article as: Bonini, S., et al., Angel network affiliation and business angels' investment practices, J. Corp. Finance
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In this paper, we provide novel evidence of the effects of BA participation in a BAN on BA investment decisions. Looking at a
unique dataset that contains qualitative and quantitative information on 810 investments from 2008 to 2014, we contribute to the
extant literature by providing preliminary evidence of the existence of significantly different investment practices influenced by
BAN membership. Affiliation with an angel group generates valuable information and risk reduction effects that ultimately in-
crease the amount of capital that angels invest in new ventures. Similarly, BAN members enjoy significant diversification benefits,
larger deal flows, and access to network screening and monitoring skills. These factors causally affect angels' portfolios by reduc-
ing the individual stake in each company while expanding the relative size of their portfolios devoted to early stage investments,
thereby implementing a classical diversification strategy. In an extensive set of multivariate tests, we also show that the possibility
to co-invest appears to be a factor that significantly affects their investment decisions, giving them the possibility, on the one
hand, to benefit from risk-reduction effects and, on the other hand, to continue playing an active role in the target company.
The unique characteristics of the dataset allow us to control for novel factors such as the stated willingness to play an active/
passive role and to closely monitor the company through soft, non-contractual based mechanisms. The results are markedly dif-
ferent conditional on participation in an informal investor organization: non-BAN members invest less capital if they plan to play
a passive role, but angels counterbalance this effect through a stronger monitoring effort. In other words, BAN members can re-
duce direct, individual monitoring efforts through superior networking skills and shared monitoring of portfolio companies. Angel
communities thus seem to be able to decrease and distribute the need for individual monitoring while increasing member con-
fidence in the investments.
Interestingly, past experience as an entrepreneur or a manager has strong effects on capital allocation decisions conditional on
being affiliated with a group. Past managers who are also BAN members invest 30% more capital and acquire almost twice the
stake in a portfolio company than non-BAN members. However, BAN membership has no effect on entrepreneurs who exhibit
a preference to invest alone.
Policymakers have increasingly supported the role of BAs in stimulating entrepreneurship as a crucial driver of economic
growth, promoting the development of the angel community through dedicated government-sponsored programs. Our results
provide valuable information to further such development—which has proven to be one of the major enablers of new ventures
and a crucial precursor to formal venture capital (Baldock and Mason, 2015; Kraemer-Eis et al., 2016) —by improving the eco-
nomic efficiency of the policy design, and ultimately, stimulating social welfare.
Our contribution opens up numerous avenues of additional research. First, obtaining more specific data on BAN and AGs may
help highlight possible variations in the effects of these different forms of association on angel investment practices. Second, fruit-
ful insights can come from extending the analysis to an international level through worldwide-based BA samples. Third, the rel-
ative role of angels as a complement to or substitute for venture capital (Hellman et al. 2015) could be tested by exploring the
long term survivorship and performance of companies backed by angels, BANs, and AGs. Finally, little is still known about the in-
ternal dynamics of knowledge generation and dissemination across BAN members and its effects on the support and survivorship
of the invested companies.
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